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MOTIONS TO MAKE COMPLAINTS AND PARTS OF
COMPLAINTS MORE SPECIFIC, DEFINITE AND
CERTAIN AND TO STATE FACTS SUPPORTING
CONCLUSIONS IN MOTOR VEHICLE
NEGLIGENCE CASES
I.
The purpose of this article is to point out and illustrate,
as far as practicable, to the courts, lawyers and law students
of the State of Indiana, a method of determining when a
motion is made to make a complaint, or parts of a com-
plaint, more specific, definite or certain and to state facts
supporting conclusions, as related to motor vehicle negli-
gence, should be sustained and when it should be denied or
overruled, as supported by the rules of practice and the
decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of the State
of Indiana.
It is also the purpose of this article to point out to the
trial courts the extent that a number of lawyers have 're-
sorted to in filing motions to make complaints more specific,
certain and definite for the purpose of delaying the closing
of the issues, and for the purpose of making further investi-
gation as to evidence and to delay the trial of the cause until
witnesses have moved away to parts unknown, so that their
evidence may not be obtainable, and the abuses thereby
which may result in the repeal of the statute.
II.
STATUTES OF INDIANA
Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes ' provide as follows:
"Allegations in pleadings, construction.-Hereafter, in all pleadings,
papers or writings which are filed in or before any court in any civil
or criminal case, or in any proceeding of any kind, where the suffi-
ciency of the same can, may be or is called in question, all recitals
therein, and all statements contained in any participial expression, or
1 § 360 (1926).
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following the words 'having' or 'being,' shall be considered and held
to be allegations of fact whenever necessary to the sufficiency thereof;
and all conclusions stated therein shall be considered and held to be
the allegation of. all the facts required to sustain said conclusion when
the same is necessary to the sufficiency of such pleading, paper or
writing.
"Provided, That, as against 'such conclusions, only the following
remedy is given, that a motion may be made to require the party
filing such pleading, paper or writing to state the facts necessary to
sustain the conclusiois alleged, said motion setting out wherein such
pleading, paper or writing is insufficient. If no such motion is made
and ruled upon, all objections on account thereof are waived."
The Statutes of Indiana also provide as to Liberal Con-
struction and Indefiniteness of pleadings and how corrected
as follows: 2
"In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its
effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to sub-
stantial justice between the parties; but when the allegations of a
pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the
charge or defense is not apparent, the court may require the pleading
to be made definite and certain by amendment."
III.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOTIONS AS BASED ON ABOVE
STATUTES
It is often quite difficult to distinguish between the dif-
ferent motions to make more specific, motions to state facts
to support conclusions and motions to make more definite
and certain. It has been said that there is very little dif-
ference, if any, between a motion to make more specific and
a motion to make more definite and certain. It has been the
common practice of lawyers to state both in the caption,
such as follows: "Motion to make the pleading more spe-
cific, definite and certain." There is, however, a distinction
between motion to make more specific and a motion to
state facts to support a conclusion, as the former is based
on Section 403 as above set out, while the latter is based on
Section 360 as above set out, and, therefore, the distinction
2 BumNs' ANNo. IND. STAT. (1926) § 403.
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is based entirely upon the construction of these statutes as
construed by the Appellate and Supreme Courts of the State
of Indiana.
IV.
MOTION TO STATE FACTS SUPPORTING CONCLUSIONS IN
PLEADINGS-APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
These statutes apply to all answers as well as complaints
and especially is this true in an answer pleading an estoppel,
without setting out facts -constituting the estoppel. A mo-
tion to require the pleader to set out the facts sustaining the
estoppel, is the only remedy.3
The statute does not apply, however, to all conclusions in
a pleading, but only to those which are necessary to the
sufficiency of the pleading. As to any conclusions unneces-
sary to the sufficiency of the pleading, the law remains as
it has always been, viz., they may be disregarded.
In the case of Premier Motor Mfg. Co. v. Tilford' Judge
Hottel says that Section 360, Burns' Statutes of Indiana,
"does not require every conclusion stated in a pleading to
be considered and treated as the allegation of the facts nec-
essary to sustain such conclusion, but expressly limits its
application to such conclusions as are necessary to the suffi-
ciency of the pleading.. As to conclusions unnecessary to
the sufficiency of a pleading, the law remains as it has always
been, viz., any statement in a pleading whether made by
way of conclusion, or direct averment of fact, if unneces-
sary to the sufficiency thereof, may be disregarded and hence
any ruling on a motion to make such an averment more
specific would be necessarily harmless."
In the case of Tecumseh Coal and Mining Co. v. Buck 5
Judge Ewbank says "That mere averments of legal con-
3 Schlosser v. Nicholson, 184 Ind. 283-288, Ill N. E. 13 (1916).
4 61 Ind. App. 164, at p. 167 (1916).
5 192 Ind. 122-125 (1923).
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clusions amount to nothing and must be disregarded." ' The
court further says that it cannot be a reversible error to over-
rule a motion to make averments More specific when such
averments are not material.
V.
SUCCESSIVE MOTIONS TO MAKE COMPLAINTS MORE SPECIFIC
Judge Ewbank, in the case of Tecumseh Coal & Mining
Co. v. Buck, above cited, says:
"The law does not contemplate that the defendant, in an action may
file a succession of motions, one after the other, as they are succes-
sively overruled, asking in each that the facts relied on shall be stated
more definitely."
And ordinarily it is within the sound legal discretion of the
trial court to reject a second motion that requires a more
definite and certain statement of facts, after overruling the
one first presented.
In the above case, after a motion to make the complaint
more specific had been overruled, the defendant fil~d a mo-
tion to require the plaintiff to plead facts to sustain alleged
conclusions of facts as well as of several conclusions of law.
The court further stated that "a motion of that kind tends
to delay the formation of an issue and the decision of the
case, and ordinarily it is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to reject a second motion to require a more defi-
nite and certain statement of the facts after overruling the
first one presented."
VI.
TiME OF MAKING SUCH MOTION
A motion to make a pleading more specific or to state facts
to support conclusions of law must be made before it is
answered, unless upon leave of court, the answer is with-
drawn.' Likewise, there is good authority for the proposi-
tion that it must precede a demurrer to the pleadiing.8
6 Temple v. State, 185 Ind. 139 (1916); Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Little,
Admr., 190 Ind. 662 (1921).
7 Hart v. Walker, 77 Ind. 331 (1880).
8 Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1 (1882).
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VII.
WHEN MOTION DOES NOT LIE
A motion to make a pleading more specific should be
overruled under the following conditions, to-wit:
(1) When the motion calls for the pleading of facts
which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the movant.9
(2) Where the requisite information is not within the
reach of the pleader.'"
(3) Where the movant is seeking to have an unneces-
sary allegation made more specific. 1
(4) Where the pleading is already as definite as the
laws of pleading require. 2
(5) Where the motion would require the party to plead
to disclose evidence.'
VIII.
OVERRULING OR SUSTAINING OF THE MOTION
NOT IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT
Where the motion is well founded it is not in the discre-
tion of the trial court to sustain or overrule the motion, but
it is as much the duty of the court to sustain the motion as
it is to sustain a demurrer to an insufficient pleading, and the
refusal of the court to grant an order requiring the pleader
to amend his pleading is reversible error on appeal.'" How-
ever, before a reversal will be granted on an appeal, the
complaining party must show that he has been deprived of
some substantial right by such ruling. 5
9 Rockwell Co. v. Brumbaugh, 59 Ind. App. 640-646 "(1915).
10 B. & 0. R. Co. v. Countryman, 16 Ind. App. 1391 (1897).
11 A. J. Yawger Co. v. Joseph, 184 Ind. 228-231 (1916).
12 Kinmore v. Cresse, 53 Ind. App. 693-698, 102 N. E. 403 (1918).
13 31 Cyc. 647 and cases cited therein.
14 Premier Motor Mfg. Co. v. Tilford, op. cit. supra note 4; S. W. Little
Coal Co. v. O'Brieh, 63 Ind. App. 504 (1917);.A. J. Yawger Co. v. Joseph,-
op. cit. supra note 11.
15 Kinmore v. Cresse, op. cit. supra note 12; Ind. Mfg. Co. v. Coughlin,
65 Ind. App. 268, 115 N. E. 260-262 (1916).
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Ix.
AS APPLICABLE TO SPECIFIC ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE
IN MOTOR VEHICLE CASES
A. BRAKES-The statutes of the State of Indiana 16
provide that every motor vehicle or motor bicycle operated
or driven upon any public highway in this state shall be pro-
vided with good and adequate brakes in good working or-
der and sufficient to control such motor vehicle or motor
bicycle at all times when the same is in use.
A complaint or an allegation in a complaint as an act of
negligence for the violation of the above statute that simply
states "that at the time of the alleged injuries defendant's
automobile was not provided with good and adequate
brakes in good working order" may state a cause of action
which would be sufficient as against a demurrer, but the
bare allegation alone without alleging any facts in what
manner the brakes were deficient or stating any facts show-
ing their condition as to whether they were out of adjust-
ment, loose, worn, or that the defect was a latent defect or
that defendant had knowledge of said defect,. or that the
brake drums were oily or greasy, or to show at least some
condition that the brakes were not good or adequate at the
time of the alleged injuries, would not be sufficient to ap-
prise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him
in operating his motor vehicle when the same was not pro-
vided with good and adequate brakes, and a motion to re-
quire the pleader to state facts to support the conclusion
that the brakes were not adequate should be sustained. It
has been held that an unforseen failure of equipment will
not necessarily expose an operator of an automobile to a
charge of negligence.17
In my opinion, the allegation should state the nature of
the defect and it should be alleged so that the defendant
16 Bums', op. it. supra note 2, § 10126.
17 Rath v. Bankston, 281 Pac. 1081 (Cal. 1929).
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may determine whether or not, by the exercise of ordinary
care in the inspection of his automobile, he could have dis-
covered the defect and thus prevented the operation of the
motor vehicle in a defective condition. 8
B. RIGHT OF WAY-The Statutes of Indiana 19 pro-
vide for the right of way of motor vehicles as follows:
"Motor vehicles and motor bicycles traveling upon any public high-
way shall give the right of way to any other vehicle, motor bicycle
or any other vehicles approaching along an intersecting highway from
the right and shall have the right of way over those vehicles approach-
ing along an intersecting highway from the left (subject to certain
exceptions not herein set-out)."
It is quite common among lawyers in drafting complaints
for negligence for failure to yield the right of way to state
"that the plaintiff was traveling in a northerly direction on
a certain highway and that the defendant was traveling in
an easterly direction on an intersecting highway; that on
arriving at the intersection, the defendant failed to yield
the right of way," or to allege "that the plaintiff was ap-
proaching the intersection of certain highways 'to the right
of the defendant and defendant failed to yield the right of
way," and fail to allege any facts as to the respective speeds
of the automobiles on approaching the intersection or their
respective distances from the place of intersection. Such a
bare allegation "that the defendant failed to yield the right
of way" is a conclusion, and a proper motion made at the
proper time to require the pleader to state facts to sustain
the conclusion should be sustained, for the reason that the
right of way given to the driver approaching from the right
is not an absolute one, neither is the fact of which driver
arrives first at the intersection of the streets necessarily of
controlling influence,2" and the application of the law does not
18 1 BLASHFIELD, CYcLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBIIE LAW Annotated (1927) Chap-
ter 18, p. 376; 3 HUDDY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (9th ed. 1931)
Chapter 3, § 71, p. 127.
19 BURNs', op. cit. supra note 2, § 10154.
20 Blasengym v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Ldt., 89 Ind. App.
524, 165 N. E. 262 (1929).
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apply; unless the trevels or vehicles on intersecting streets
approach the crossing at the same time or so nearly at the
same time, and at such a rate of speed that if both proceed,
each without regard to the other, a collision or interference
between them is reasonably to be apprehended; and if a
traveler not having a right of precedence at a street inter-
section comes to the crossing and finds no one approach-
ing it upon the other street within such distance as reason-
ably to indicate danger of interference or collision, he is un-
der no obligation to stop or to wait, but may proceed to
use such crossing as a matter of right.21
C. SPEED-The Statutes of Indiana 2 provide as fol-
lows as to the speed of motor vehicles and motor bicyles:
"No person shall drive or operate a motor vehicle or motor bicycle
upon any public highway in this state at a speed greater or less than is
reasonable or prudent, having regard to the width of the highway, the
density of the traffic, the condition of the weather and the use of the
highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property
of any person. If the rate of speed of any motor vehicle or motor
bicycle driven or operated upon any public highway in this state where
such highway passes through the closely built up business portion of
any city, town or village exceeds twenty miles per hour; or if the
rate of speed of any motor vehicle or motor bicycle driven or operated
upon any public highway in this state where such highway passes
through the residence portion of any city, town or village exceeds thirty
miles per hour; such rate of speed shall be prima facie evidence that
the person driving or operating such motor vehicle or motor bicycle
is running at a rate of speed which is greater than is reasonable and
prudent."
Many lawyers in drafting a complaint for negligence for
violation of the speed laws simply allege "that the defendant
at the time of the alleged injuries was driving and operating
the motor vehicle at a high and dangerous rate of speed" or
21 Barnes v. Barnett, 184 Iowa 936, 169 N. W. 365 (1918); Mattes v. Brugg-
ner, 88 Ind. App. 36, 159.N. E. 156 (1929); Wolf v. Vehling, 79 Ind. App. 221,
137 N. E. 713 (1923); Keltner v. Patton, 159 N. E. 162 (1927).
Contra: Elgin Dairy Co. v. Shepherd, 183 Ind. 466 [This case, however, was
decided before the statute relative to right of way was in effcct (1915)1; Kent
County Motor Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 140 Atl. 646 (Del. 1926).
22 AcTs, 1929, p. 617.
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"at a high and unlawful rate of speed" without alleging any
other facts as to the conditions or circumstances, relying en-
tirely on the fact that the simple allegations of a "high and
dangerous rate of speed" or "high and unlawful rate of
speed" are sufficient as against a demurrer under the com-
mon law. It is true that there are many cases that have
held that the words "high and dangerous rate of speed" and
"high and unlawful rate of speed" are sufficient allegations
of negligence under the common law, yet under Indiana law
these allegations are mere conclusions, and without any mo-
tion to require the pleader to state facts to sustain the con-
clusions, either of them would be sufficient; yet if a motion
is addressed to either of them to require the pleader to
state facts to sustain these conclusions, it should be sus-
tained, for the reason that the above statute regulates the
speed of motor vehicles in Indiana and the law states that
a speed that is greater than a fixed rate in certain districts
of a city, town or village, shall be prima facie evidence that
the operator was driving and operating the motor vehicle at
a greater rate of speed than is reasonable and prudent, hav-
ing regard to the width of the highway, the density of the
traffic, the condition of the weather and the use of the high-
way, or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the prop-
erty of any person. And the defendant is entitled to know
the rate of speed that he is charged with operating his motor
vehicle and the location where such speed occurred and other
conditions, if any, that are set-out in the statute. In my
opinion, the defendant is entitled to know all of the nec-
essary material allegations of fact that makes the rate of
speed he is charged with traveling prima facie evidence of
driving and operating his motor vehicle at a greater rate of
speed than was reasonable or prudent.
If the courts aie to hold that such allegations as "high
and dangerous rate of speed," "high and unlawful rate of
speed" are to be sufficient on a motion to require the pleader
to state facts to support such conclusions, the time will not
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be very far off when the lawyers in order to charge an act
of negligence of speed, will only need to state "that at the
time of the injuries, the defendant was violating the speed
laws of the State of Indiana." There is only one way to
correct the common habit of pleading such conclusions in
motor vehicle negligence cases, and that is, to sustain a mo-
tion to require the pleader to state facts to support the con-
clusions and enter an order to that effect, and especially
such facts that are material and necessary. When the court
does this, and the pleader has amended his complaint, or
the allegation of negligence relative to speed, the court can
then without hesitation give the instructions on speed laws
as laid down by the decisions in the State of Indiana, the
form of which is as follows:
No. 1. I instruct you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that there
was in full force and effect at the time of the alleged in-
juries to plaintiff as complained of in plaintiff's complaint,
a statute in the State of Indiana with reference to the speed
of automobiles, to-wit: (Copy speed statute as above set-
out).
No. 2. With reference to the statute I have just given
you, I instruct you that if you find by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant at the time the alleged
injuries in question' occurred, was driving and operating his
automobile on a public street and highway in the city of
where the same passes through a residence portion of said
city, at a greater rate of speed than thirty (30) miles per
hour, then I instruct you that such speed, if any, should be
by you considered as prima facie evidence that the defendant
was driving and operating said automobile at a speed greater
than was reasonable or prudent, having regard to the width
of the highway, the density of the traffic, the condition of
the weather and the use of the highway, or so as to endanger
the life or limb or injure the property of any person.
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This simply means that in absence of all other evidence,
the evidence of speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per
hour under the conditions named, may be considered as a
speed greater than is reasonable or prudent, having regard
to the width of the highway, the condition of the weather,
the density of the traffic, and the use of the highway or so
as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any
person.
However, it is for you to determine from all the evidence
in the case, whether or not the defendant was driving at a
speed in excess of thiry (30) miles per hour and whether
such speed was negligence under the circumstances.2"
One of the perplexing questions that has come to the trial
courts of Indiana is as to whether or not it is proper to in-
struct the jury by giving them the instructions relative to
speed as based on the above statute as have been supported
by the decisions of the Appellate and Supreme Courts of
Indiana when the complaint alleges only common law negli-
gence of speed.
The Appellate Court of Illinois held that a count in a dec-
laration charging that defendant drove his motor truck at
"a high, excessive, unreasonable and dangerous rate of
speed, to-wit: at the rate of thirty miles per hour," by rea-
son of the videlicet, not to charge that the vehicle was be-
ing driven at any particular number of miles per hour, and,
therefore, not to justify an instruction that running a motor
vehicle at a speed of more than twenty miles per hour was
prima facie evidence that the rate of speed was greater than
was reasonable and proper under Section 10 of the motor
vehicle act of the State of Illinois in the year of 1911.24
23 Buchanan v. Morris, 198 Ind. 79 (1927); Gallaher v. State, 193 Ind.
629 at p. 639 (1923); Miller v. Johnson, 82 Ind. App. 85 (1925); Russell v.
Scharge, 76 Ind. App. 191 (1921).
24 1 BERRY ON AVTOmoBm.s, 6th ed., § 184, p. 151, and footnotes; Fippinger
v. Glos, 190 Ill. App. 238 (1914).
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In my opinion, the act of 1929 of the State of Indiana as
above set-out does not fix a speed limit in any locality but
prescribes a rule of evidence to the effect that exceeding
a certain speed rate in certain localities will be prima facie
evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent, and if a pleader expects to take advantage of hav-
ing the court instruct the jury as to the prima facie rule of
evidence, he must allege in his complaint the necessary al-
legations of speed as set-out in the statute to support such
an instruction, otherwise the trial court will be compelled
to give to the jury the common law instructions relative
to speed.
D. RECKLESS DRIVING-The Act of 1929 of the
State of Indiana, at page 619, sets out and states particular-
ly what constitutes reckless driving of a motor vehicle or mo-
tor bicycle. Quite frequently attorneys in drafting complaints
for reckless driving simply allege "that the -defendant at the
time of the alleged injuries was guilty of reckless driving"
without stating any other fact as to what constitutes the
reckless driving. The above statutes specifically states that
reckless driving shall be construed to mean: (1) Driving on
that side of the highway which is to the left of the operator;
(2) Driving in and out of line of traffic except as provided
elsewhere in the act; (3) Driving from side to side of the
highway; (4) Driving at such an unreasonably slow rate of
speed as to endanger traffic; (5) Refusing to give one-half
of the highway to the driver or operator approaching
from the rear at greater rate of speed and desiring to pass;
(6) Passing or attempting to pass another vehicle from the
rear while on the brow of a hill or on a curve where vision
is obstructed for a distance of less than five hundred feet
ahead of any vehicle desiring to pass another.
So if a pleader alleges only that the defendant at the
time of the alleged injuries was guilty of reckless driving
without setting-out any facts to constitute such reckless
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driving, then the bare statement is a conclusion and if a
motion in proper time and properly addressed to the-court
to require the pleader to state facts to support the conclu-
sion as alleged is made, such motion should be sustained. A
person charged with reckless driving is entitled to know the
facts constituting the reckless driving so that he may be
able to properly prepare his defense thereto. The court,
likewise, is entitled to know and require the pleader to state
the facts that constitute reckless driving under the statute
so that he may be able to properly instruct the jury and in
his instructions state to the jury the statute that was in effect
at the time, defining reckless driving and what acts are to be
construed as meaning reckless driving.
In the case of Lorber v. Peoples Motor Coach Co. 5 the
court stated, "that the violation of that part of the motor
vehicle law relative to reckless driving by the driving on that
side of the highway which is to the left of the operator was
at least prima facie negligence." So, therefore, if a viola-
tion of the above statute is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence, certainly the courts should require the pleader to
specifically charge the facts necessary to support a con-
clusion of a bare statement of reckless driving.
E. AGENCY-The allegation of agency in automobile
negligence cases has become one of the most important al-
legations of a complaint. The reason being that it has be-
come a common practice of agents, chauffeurs and employees,
during the noon hour and after business hours, to use their
employer's motor vehicles for their own private affairs, with-
out consent or knowledge on the part of the employer. A
corporation cannot operate its motor vehicles except by
and through the driver thereof as its agent. This being
true, the allegations "that the defendant corporation, at the
time of the alleged injuries received, was driving and opera-
ting its motor vehicle by its agent, servant, chauffeur or em-
25 164 N. E. 859 (Ind. App. 1929).
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ployee in the due scope of his employment" are not sufficient
when a motion is made requiring the court to enter an order
to require the pleader to make the complaint more specific by
stating facts to support the conclusion; such facts as to state
what the agent, chauffeur, servant or employee of the de-
fendant corporation was doing and what business of the
defendant he was furthering at the time of the alleged in-
juries or accident, are necessary to the sufficiency of the
complaint.
The above allegation of agency states two conclusions:
(1) That the driver was the agent or servant of the de-
fendant; (2) That he was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the alleged injuries or accident.
Judge Hottel says, in the case of Premier Motor Mfg. Co.
v. Tilford,26 "that the pleader ought not to be relieved from
stating facts upon which the above conclusions are based."
He also states that "the facts on which the above conclu-
sions are based are necessary to the sufficiency of the com-
plaint for the reason that the master is responsible only for
the acts of his servant done in obedience to express orders
or directions of the master or in the execution of the master's
business within the scope of his employment, and for acts
in any sense warranted by the express or implied authority
conferred upon him, considering the nature of the services
required, the instructions given and the circumstances under
which the act is done." The court further says "that de-
fendant was not liable merely because it was the owner of
the automobile and the driver thereof was in its employ.
Such facts do not make the owner of the automobile liable
for injuries caused by the driver's negligence while such
driver was riding for his own pleasure and profit and not
upon the owner's business." This case holds that while
in many jurisdictions the fadt that the automobile was ad-
mitted to belong to defendant, a corporation, and that the
26 Op. cit. supra note 4.
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driver was in the employ of the corporation and opera-
ting the automobile with its knowledge and consent, in the
absence of anything to the contrary, was sufficient to give
rise to the inference that the relation of owner and chauffeur
or agent existed between the corporation and such driver and
hence put the defendant upon the proof that the automobile
was not used in its business or for its employment."
In my opinion in the future the Appellate Courts will hold
that it is a necessary allegation of agency to allege the act
or thing the driver, chauffeur or agent of a corporation was
doing for the corporation and to prove the facts of such al-
legation at the trial, before the corporation will be held
liable, and that the defendant corporation, because of infer-
ence that might arise from ownership or the driver being
an employee of the defendant corporation, will not be re-
quired to prove that the motor vehicle was not being used
in the furtherance of the business of the corporation at the
time of the alleged negligence.
F. LOOKOUT-The allegation "that the driver of a mo-
tor vehicle failed to keep a lookout" is an allegation of negli-
gence under the common law, but when a pleader in an al-
legation of a complaint states "that the defendant failed to
keep a proper lookout," such an allegation raises the infer-
ence of the degree of care required, whether or not the de-
fendant should have kept, under the circumstances, a con-
stant watch or lookout, or a vigilant watch or lookout, or
such a watch or lookout as an ordinarily prudent person
would have kept under like or similar circumstances, and,
therefore, an allegation "that the defendant failed to keep a
proper lookout" may, under some circumstances, be a con-
clusion, especially when no other facts are alleged stating the
degree of care required.
27 DAviD, MOTOR VEHICLES, § 209; Burger v. Taxicab Motor Company, 66
Wash. 676, 120 Pac. 519 (1912).
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So when a motion is addressed to the bare statement "the
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout" to require the
pleader to state what a proper lookout should be at the time
of the alleged injuries or accident in question, it should be
sustained for the reason that the defendant cannot deter-
mine from the pleading what a "proper lookout" under the
circumstances would be, and, therefore, would not apprise
the defendant of sufficient and necessary facts to meet the
proof. For what might be a "proper lookout" in one case,
might not be a "proper lookout" in another. It seems to
me that it is a question of fact for the jury to decide whether
or not under all the facts and circumstances, a driver kept
a "proper lookout" so that in order to admit proof under an
allegation of lookout, if the pleader is going to plead a con-
clusion and expect to rely upon it, which under the common
law would be a sufficient allegation as against demurrer, and
expects to introduce evidence showing that the defendant
failed to keep a lookout, he would ordinarily be required to
allege facts showing what the "proper lookout" or watch
should be.
X.
There may be many other instances where conclusions are
alleged in automobile negligence, both statutory and com-
mon law, that could be mentioned, but I have only attempted
to point out those that are of common practice. In my opin-
ion, the statutes providing for motions to make conclu-
sions more specific and to require the pleader to state the
necessary facts to support or sustain his conclusions, are of
a vast help to the courts and to defendants that are charged
with negligence, for the reason that it clears the court's
docket, places the negligence squarely before the court and
jury so that the court may understand what the plaintiff ex-
pects to prove and what the defendant is expected to meet
and can govern his instructions to the jury accordingly.
However, if the lawyers at the bar attempt to use these stat-
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utes as a means of a delay in closing the issues and the try-
ing of the cause, by filing flimsy motions such as requiring
the pleader to state the width of the street, or a distance of
a tree or a post from the intersection, or various other geo-
graphical requirements which knowledge the defendant has
or can readily obtain, all that have no merit whatever, the
time will not be far off when these statutes will be repealed
and, unless the legislature gives further remedy, the only
remedy then left for a pleader will be a motion to strike or
a demurrer to each specific allegation of negligence, and the
allegation in a great many instances might state facts to
constitute a cause of action, either under the common law or
under a statute and be sufficient as against a demurrer, and,
therefore, would necessarily be overruled by the court and
the defendant would not have the necessary averments that
he is justly entitled to have.
Clifford V. DuComb.
South Bend, Indiana.
